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ABSTRACT
The article begins with an overview of the causes of the economic and financial crisis that struck
in the fall of 2008. It then sets out to show how the failure to give due consideration to collect -
ive consumer interests and representation led to a lopsided interpretation of the role control
agencies were expected to play. It concludes with the idea that effective political involvement
by consumers is an essential safeguard in a democracy and an important factor for softening
the impact of economic crises on consumers in the future.
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RESUMEN
este artículo inicia con un panorama de las causas de la crisis económica y financiera que
golpeó en el otoño de 2008; después continúa mostrando cómo el error que significó no dar la
consideración debida a los intereses colectivos de los consumidores llevó a una interpretación
miope del papel que las agencias de control debían desempeñar. Con cluye con la idea de que
un involucramiento político de los consumidores es una garantía fundamental para una de -
mocracia y un factor importante para suavizar el impacto de las crisis económicas sobre los
consumidores en el futuro.
Palabras clave: intereses de los consumidores, agencias regulatorias, gobernanza, derechos
colectivos, democracia.
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ThIS arTICle IS BUIlT around two related themes: governance and consumer democracy.
But before I come to the crux of my argument, I would like to present a brief over -
view of what analysts had to say about the causes of the economic crisis that struck
in the fall of 2008 in order to bring to the fore that particular blind spot into which
consumer interests have fallen over the years. Furthermore, I want to use the last of
the six explanations reviewed, the one on corruption, to present what can be con-
strued as a collective right benefiting each and every investor or regulator, whereas
debtors or homeowners acting on their own hold mere individual rights. Clearly, this
apparent paradox must be laid out in order to understand the legal and sociologi-
cal nature of the process of representation of interests in public agencies. These two
dimensions will be presented in section 1, while sections 2 and 3 will tackle the issue
of governance and set out to show how the failure to give due consideration to col-
lective consumer interests and representation led not only to a lax interpretation of
existing regulations, but more significantly, to a lopsided reading of the role control
agencies were supposed to play in these circumstances. I will conclude with the idea
that effective collective consumer involvement is an essential safeguard in a democ-
racy and, as such, an important factor, if not for preventing crises in the future, for
softening their impact on those who should not be made to pay and suffer for the
bungling coming out of financial wizardry. I should add that neither The Financial
Crisis Inquiry Report, released in January 2011,1 nor the european Commission’s
working document Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: Lessons to Be Drawn
from the Current Financial Crisis, Best Practices, dated February 6, 2010,2 address the
issues raised here. This does not mean nor does it imply that consumer groups and
organizations were not consulted by agencies or even by the Federal reserve Con -
sumer advisory Council. on the contrary; but, as the report to Congress states quite
clearly, the warnings from consumer representatives had no impact whatsoever on
policy or ongoing practices at the time. In this sense, the main hypothesis advanced
here holds that consultation mechanisms are insufficient and inadequate, as the un -
folding of the financial and mortgage crises has shown, and that some form of collec -
tive and political representation of consumer interests within agencies and regulatory
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1 The Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission was set up by Congress and signed into existence by the presi-
dent in May 2009. Congress followed this by passing in January 2010 the Dodd-Frank Wall Street reform
and Consumer Protection act which provides (in Section 1014) for the establishment of a Consumer
advisory Board “to advise and consult with the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection” (set up under
Section  1001 of the act). This is probably a step in the right direction, but the issue raised here has more
to do with the lack of collective representation of consumers in public agencies before the 2008 crisis hit
than with the effectiveness of the remedies proposed in its aftermath. 
2 The document in question was prepared by the commission staff as an accompanying document to the
Green Paper on Corporate Governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies.
boards could serve as a countervailing power to the rights and priviledges of bankers
and investors, and thus offer consumers some measure of protection.
DIAGNOSING THE CRISIS
There are far too many interpretations of the 2008 crises to be presented in the space
allotted for this article. I therefore propose a brief overview of six explanations start-
ing off with an oddity: an argument according to which the crisis, even though it was
manufactured by humans, was put in the hands of computers and has lead us toward
some kind of  “creative destruction” –Schumpeter’s expression– gone wild. This inter-
pretation was proposed by richard Dooling in an article entitled “Market velo city.
Machines of Mass Destruction,” in which he starts off by recalling that, “Years ago,
Warren Buffett called derivatives ‘weapons of financial mass destruction.’” Dooling
follows this up with the idea that, like the developers of nuclear weapons before
them, the Wall Street geeks, the quantitative analysts (“quants”) and masters of
“algo trading,” probably felt the same irresistible lure of “illimitable power” when
they discovered “evolutionary algorithms” that allowed them to create vast empires
of wealth by deriving the dependence structures of portfolio credit derivatives. he
adds, “Somehow the genius quants fed [US]$1 trillion in subprime mortgage debt into
their supercomputers, added some derivatives, massaged the arrangements with
computer algorithms, and –poof!– created [US]$62 trillion in imaginary wealth. It’s
not much of a stretch to imagine that all of that imaginary wealth is locked up
somewhere inside the computers, and that we humans, led by the silverback males
of the financial world, Ben Bernanke and henry Paulson, are frantically beseeching
the monolith for answers. as the current financial crisis spreads (like a computer virus)
on the earth’s nervous system (the Internet), it’s worth asking if we have somehow
managed to colossally outsmart ourselves using computers. only computers can un -
derstand and derive a correlation structure from observed collateralized debt obliga -
tion. Which leads us to the next question: Just how much of the world’s financial
stability now lies in the ‘hands’ of computerized trading algorithms?” (Dooling, 2008: 8).
This argument, eccentric though it may seem, carries a serious implication: that
we could be caught up in a new form of alienation cum –that is, with– reification on
a grand scale for which there are no foreseeable exit strategies at this point, barring
some kind of collapse of the system itself (honneth, 2006). Some of the comments
made at the time by bankers seem to point in this direction. For instance, following
a meeting of central bank governors at the headquarters of the Bank for
International Settlements in Basel, Jean-Claude Trichet, at that time president of the
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european Central Bank, declared that “as regards to the perspective we have in
front of us, in terms of the real economy, it’s a very complex situation where we
have a very large number of parameters to take into account” (Trichet, 2009). Which
is probably a polite way of saying that both he and his colleagues were clueless as
to what to do and what to expect.
nevertheless, for an overwhelming number of analysts, the financial and ulti-
mately economic crises of 2008 were the product of market liberalization implement-
ed in the 1980s. For some, liberalization was a good thing that was not pursued
with the required determination and was left unfinished, with the result that the
ensuing crisis –as with any crisis– cannot be imputed to liberalization per se basi-
cally because crises are unavoidable and unpredictable by nature; they simply have
to be contended with. For others, market liberalization had gone too far and some
measure of control and regulation should be brought back into the system. an
interesting and most indicative combination of pro-market ideology and govern-
ment bailout was provided by The Economist, a staunch propagandist of free trade
since 1843. Writing on the White house plan to rescue the financial sector in fall 2008,
its editorial board decided to “put dogma aside” and plead for intervention:
In america, Congress dithered over the Bush administration’s [US]$700 billion bail-out
plan….This is a time to put dogma and politics to one side and concentrate on pragmat-
ic answers. That means more government intervention and co-operation in the short
term than taxpayers, politicians, or indeed free-market newspapers would normally like.
…The twist is that this credit crisis is deeper (it affects many more types of markets)
and broader (many more countries). any solution has to be both more systemic and
more global than before. (The Economist, 2008a: 15)
Clearly such a departure from dogma was justified under the circumstances
and should be renounced as soon as conditions warrant. In the meantime, govern-
ments were requested to act as intercessors of last resort, even though nothing was
said concerning the impacts of these rescues on the taxpayers who would ultima -
tely foot the bill. But further on in the very same issue, in a report entitled “When
Fortune Frowned,” the writers had this to say about government intervention: “Pro -
vocative as it may sound in today’s febrile and dangerous climate, freer and more
flexible markets will still do more for the world economy than the heavy hand of
government” (The Economist, 2008b: 5). To sum up, as far as The Economist was con-
cerned at least, “putting dogma aside” meant that the right hand ignored what the
left one was doing, which seemed like a fit reflection of what a lot of governments
and organizations were doing at the time.
Be that as it may, if The Economist sought the roots of the crisis in “the biggest
housing and credit bubble in history” (2008a: 4), in his critique of Stiglitz’s Making
Globalization Work, robert Skidelsky wrote that the crisis in question was but a sign
of a flight toward “liquidity preference,” diagnosed by Keynes back in the 1930s.3
according to this interpretation, a host of new financial instruments (notably col-
lateralized debt instruments or CDIs and structured investment vehicles or SIvs)
were “dragging down the american economy.” and he adds, “It is a perfect exam-
ple of how a financial storm can suddenly come up out of nowhere, destroying all
those sophisticated, pseudo-scientific techniques of ‘averaging’ risk by which ratio -
nal people try to convince themselves that the world is more predictable than it can
ever be” (Skidelsky, 2008: 64). In his eyes, the solution lay in macro-economic policy
where to this day two options prevail: either Keynes’s approach to market regula-
tion or that of hayek on market deregulation. 
another, albeit radical, interpretation of the crisis, invoked a so-called “shock
doctrine.” according to this view, instead of coming out of nowhere or out of mar-
ket indifference, crises are either engineered or taken advantage of in order to create
new opportunities. naomi Klein (2007) offered a most stimulating –and damning–
interpretation of this process when she set up to analyze “disaster capitalism.” If
capitalism has been exploiting the planet and its people for some two or three cen-
turies in order to create and accumulate capital, the new regime –or better still, its
new spin-off– brought about under the aegis of neoliberal and neo-conservative
fundamentalism, deliberately seeks either to instil, to program, or to create chaos as
a precondition and as a state of affairs out of which economic growth can then pro-
ceed unhindered.4 In Klein’s view, little can be done to avert or to oppose this strat-
egy outside of political self-organization by groups and victims at grassroot levels,
an alternative that ties in with what I will have to say later about the collective
rights of consumers.
For his part, writing at the height of the crisis, George Soros pointed to the fact
that if “the proximate cause is to be found in the housing bubble or more exactly in
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3 “liquidity preference” refers to a predilection for holding cash over other instruments. In Keynesian the-
ory, this preference is tied to three circumstances: as a means for transactions (buying and selling), as a
precautionary measure, or for speculative reasons. and since Keynes held that the lower the rate of inter-
est, the higher the speculative demand for money, what Skidelsky seems to imply here is that, in a context
where interest rates had been kept low for some time, speculation became rampant, while risk aversion
was at its highest. This is what led financial institutions to devise appropriate instruments that fed both
needs at once.
4 To expand briefly on naomi Klein’s thesis, one reviewer summed up her argument this way: “ The start of
the 21st century has seen the emergence of the welfare state’s evil twin, the warfare state, which regards war
and natural catastrophe as opportunities to engage in plunder, corruption, and the redistribution of wealth
from the poorest to the richest sectors of society. This is Klein’s thesis in a nutshell” (Featherstone, 2009).
the excesses of the sub-prime mortgage market…the crisis spread with amazing
rapidity to other markets. Some highly leveraged hedge funds collapsed and some
lightly regulated financial institutions, notably the largest mortgage originator in the
U.S., Countrywide Financial, had to be acquired by other institutions in order to sur -
vive” (Soros, 2008: 63). But, in the end, and contrary to what had happened previously,
“the crisis was generated by the financial system itself…[and] with the financial
system in cardiac arrest, resuscitating it took precedence over considerations of
moral hazard –i.e., the danger that coming to the rescue of a financial institution in
difficulties would reward and encourage reckless behavior in the future– and the
authorities injected ever larger quantities of money” (Soros, 2008: 63).
apparently, this “moral hazard” (rescuing the reckless) took precedence over
the obverse “practical hazard” that led to the deprivation of home-owners, lured
into easy credit schemes and victimized by financial institutions, of their homes. his
solution sounded simple: “Since [financial markets] are prone to create asset bub-
bles, regulators such as the Fed, the Treasury, and the SeC must accept responsibility
for preventing bubbles from growing too big. Until now financial authorities have
explicitly rejected that responsibility” (Soros, 2008). But rejection is a misnomer in
these circumstances precisely because the regulators in question have in fact assumed
a most commendable responsibility in their own eyes, that of protecting their own
interests and those of the financial markets at the same time. But more on this later.
Turning now to a review of Greenspan’s autobiography written six months be -
fore the subprime and mortgage crisis hit, Benjamin M. Friedman warned that “The
U.S. financial markets are suffering their rockiest period since the nation’s savings
and loan industry collapsed at the end of the 1980s. The economy either is on the
verge of the first business recession since 2001 or is already in it.…Today the wreck-
age, consisting of abandoned houses, defaulted loans, displaced homeowners, banks
making good on the billions of dollars of losses they had guaranteed, and uninsured
investors marking down their portfolios, can be seen everywhere. The damage will
surely get worse before it begins to abate. regulation of financial markets in the
United States is both spotty and fragmented among numerous agencies. one prob-
lem, from which many individual homebuyers suffered, is a straightforward gap in
existing regulation” (2008: 25-27). here, for once, the author points in the right
direction even though he faults the fragmentation among agencies, which is a rein-
forcing factor at best, over what he calls a “gap” in regulation, which had a direct
impact on homebuyers, as we shall see.
Finally, there is also the idea that the system itself is not to blame, but that cor-
rupt individuals succeeded in manipulating it for their own benefit. There are two
sides to this argument: for some, capitalism institutionalizes corruption and there
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is not much one can do about it outside of outright destruction of the system.5 For
others, the system itself cannot be faulted, but the individuals who were in charge
at the time should be held accountable for their actions. If we look closer into this
for a moment, we find that corruption can be defined as either handing out or ob -
taining an advantage through means that are illegitimate, immoral, and/or incon-
sistent with one’s duty or the rights of others. More to the point, corruption can also
be defined as an abusive use of delegated power for private ends by a delegatee (Council
of europe, 2009). There is an interesting inversion at play here: even though Ceos in the
financial and banking sectors, as well as auditors, supervisors, and watchdogs, are
all delegatees by law, given a certain set of circumstances or in a given context, they
are liable or susceptible to act either as owners of the investments (capital) with which
they are entrusted, or they may act –or refrain from doing so, which is the same thing–
in the sole interests of capital holders to the detriment of everyone else, be it the
public at large or certain stakeholders in particular. 
But let us suppose for an moment that corruption –which, let it be said in pass-
ing, undoubtedly did play a major role in the financial crisis–6 is not the central issue
and that what we are faced with is actually the playing out of a simple legal logic or,
better still, of a legal priority provided by a right to preference that places all those
who do not have such a legally enforceable lien, at best in a position of subordination,
and at worse in outright exclusion. In order to understand this argument, I will quote
from the French jurist and philosopher emmanuel lévy who, back in 1939, pub-
lished a small book entitled Les Fondements du droit (The Foundations of law), to
which I now turn for the sake of the argument I want to make here. In his book, lévy
explains that, with the arrival and implementation of the joint-stock company, there
comes about a dissociation or a disengagement between rights and duties. In this
situation, no one can actually claim ownership of a firm, its assets, and its stock.
Such a right can be exercised only when the firm is sold or liquidated. Meanwhile,
capitalists, Ceos, and the like are mere holders of debt claims. What this legal disso-
ciation entails is that under a system of publicly traded stocks, capital assumes all
duties, and capitalists hold all the rights.7 as such, capitalists are the real creditors;
they are the holders of debt claims against an invested sum of capital. lévy goes even
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5 Witness the title of an article in the French magazine Marianne (2009): “…et si tout le système était une
escroquerie?” (“…and if the whole system was a swindle?”).
6 For a recent analysis of the role played by both deregulation and corruption, see Krugman and Wells (2011:
28-29). This article is a review of the book published by Madrick, The Triumph of Finance and the Decline of
America. 1970 to the Present (2011).
7 In the present context, both notions should be understood in legal terms. Thus, capital refers to a legal enti-
ty (persona moral, in Mexican Spanish), while capitalist refers to the natural person (persona física, in
Mexican Spanish).
further and adds that such rights held and exercised by capitalists and investors are
not individual rights, they are collective rights, in that they do not accrue to a capi-
talist or to an investor qua individual, but they accrue to a given collectivity, or unity,
or group of capitalists or investors, an accretion which profits each and every mem-
ber of the group in question.
To make his point, lévy applies his reasoning to the unfolding of the legal sit-
uation in which a worker finds himself vis-à-vis the company that employs him, and
he goes on to show that, as long as the worker in question operates through the
negotiation of an individual labor contract, he has no bargaining power whatsoev-
er, and his remuneration tends toward a minimum living wage or even less. In fine,
his so-called right to a wage and to decent working conditions are variable rights; they
are rights without any substantial content since they can be systematically reduced at
will by the other party to the contract. But if workers come together as a group and
stake their claims through a process of collective bargaining, and thereby exercise a
collective right in the fullest sense of the word, those claims that make it into their
labor contract provide them with rights in the fullest sense of the word, rights that
have a substantial content and can be legally enforced. In other words, through col-
lective bargaining, workers become collective holders of a given debt claim on gains
and profits, a legal status that places them in a position equivalent or at least com-
parable to the one that Ceos, investors, or stockholders already find themselves in
by the mere fact that their claim holds precedence over all other substantive claims,
and all the more so over non-substantive ones.8
This kind of reasoning is most rewarding because it cuts through and breaks
open the apparent individualism at play in the rewards accruing to the top, while all
the rest must contend and make do with whatever is left once the plunder is over.
Because what is at play here is not tied to some individual qualification, but is actu-
ally the full legal extension of a right held by each and every Ceo, investor, or stock-
holder collectively. In this regard, blaming a given capitalist, investor, or banker is
a useless exercise. no matter who you put in these positions, private profiteers or
public servants, they will inevitably fall back on their “collective” rights, interests,
or advantages before they even start thinking –if they think at all– about the rights of
others, workers or consumers, let alone about the general good or the common in te r -
est. Better to take stock of these legalities and push for the introduction of counter-
claims based on some other collective right. 
164
Dorval BrUnelle
norTeaMérICa
8 This distinction between a collective right as opposed to an individual right can best be illustrated with
the example of the right to strike, in essence a collective right that allows a group of workers to resort to
a work stoppage to further its social and economic interests, whereas the individual who resorted to this
action would merely renounce his or her contract altogether.
I will come back to this line of argument in my last section, but for the moment,
I want to explore another avenue and look at the crisis through the issue of gover-
nance.
THE CRISIS AND GOVERNANCE
Because many of the interpretations of the crises of 2008 raised the issue of govern -
ance, a few reminders and comments are in order. The so-called “ungovernability”
of democracies was first invoked in the Report to the Trilateral Commission published
in 1975 under the authorship of Crozier, huntington, and Watanuki. over the ensu-
ing years, the notion of governance came into universal use and was made a mantra
of a sort by one and all: governments, businesses, the World Bank, and global citi-
zens’ movements. In this regard, it has become quite customary to denounce the
recent crisis as a failure of networking at the international, regional, national, or local
levels, and as a form of delinking –or lack of linking– between economic, financial,
or political institutions. In their often idealistic way of looking at things, one of the
committees set up by the european Parliament, the Committee of the regions on
“the social dimension of globalization,” had this to say about the issue at hand: 
“Good governance” of globalization can only be the result of a positive interlink between
supra-national, national as well as regional and local actors in the private and the public
sector. The framework of global governance is no longer be [sic] determined alone by the
behaviour and rules of nation states. Besides the national level, the interaction between
global actors, such as the european Union, corporate governance, and regional and local
authorities is indispensable at this level playing field. The degree of their commitment to
multilateralism, to universal values and common goals on [the] one hand, [and] the extent
of their sensitivity to the cross-border impact of their policies, and the weight they attach
to the social consequences of their actions at a global scale on the other are all vital deter-
minants of the quality of global governance. all these actors, in managing their internal
affairs, decide and influence to [what] extent people will benefit [from] globalization and
be protected from its negative effects. (european Parliament, 2005)
Unfortunately, as far as the recent financial crisis is concerned, we learned the
hard way that multiple governance schemes were neither complementary nor
interlocked. This leads us to propose three reasons why global governance schemes
have proven so inadequate and are being challenged as never before. The first has
to do with their inability to smooth out the cycle of economic and financial booms
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and busts that have struck the world economy over the past decades with their tan-
gle of environmental, energy, food, and security offshoots, which throw into stark
relief the unsustainability of the prevailing neo-liberal development model. 
The second reason, closely tied to the first, and more specifically to the role
granted market forces as the ultimate regulators of every aspect of economic, polit-
ical, social, and cultural life, is the benign neglect extended to questions of poverty
and famine, as well as to citizens’ well-being in general. This applies first and fore-
most to the international financial institutions and the numerous calls made since
1971 for setting up a new Bretton Woods Conference. It applies as well to the United
nations system itself, its bodies and organizations, which have been in dire need of
repair –to say the very least– since the fall of the Berlin Wall over 20 years ago, a task
picked up back in 1995 most notably by the Commission on Global Governance
with no result at all. It also applies to regional initiatives like the north american
Free Trade agreement,9 as well as to most of the free trade agreements negotiated
in its wake over the years. Their overarching obsession with economic growth seems
to create some kind of impunity as far as the immediate social and environmental
impacts of their actions are concerned.
Points one and two above can be tied together and, in this regard, the so-called
originality and the legitimacy of the G20,10 should indeed come under severe scrutiny
and questioning. a great deal was said by commentators about the boldness of the
initiative and about the fact that the 20 countries in question accounted for 90 per-
cent of world GDP and 80 percent of world trade, which is like saying that a national
policy initiative in a given country could be validated by involving its richer regions,
and excluding the poorer ones, or that a municipal program could be drafted by
consulting the wealthier suburbs, and disregarding the poorer neighborhoods alto-
gether. obviously, in this regard, meetings such as the G20 cannot offer legitimate
long-term alternatives to the shortcomings of either world or most regional govern -
ance schemes.
These considerations bring us to the third reason why these schemes are being
challenged, which has to do with their lopsided representation. In principle, gover n -
ance was supposed to pick up where governments and outdated business practices
had failed, at least as far as their legitimacy –if not their legality– was concerned.
and to do so, governance schemes were supposed to reach out toward a greater
number of stakeholders beyond the usual sponsors, interested parties, or partici-
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9 on the shortcomings of naFTa, see Stephen Clarkson (2008).
10 The G20 met three times in 2009, at the height of the financial crisis: in london, on March 29; in Pittsburg,
on September 25; and in St andrews, Scotland, november 7 and 8. none of the meetings had any prac-
tical results.
pants, namely politicians and business representatives. and when they do reach out
toward duly organized civil society groups, these governance schemes are more
likely to take into account labor, social, or environmental issues for which these groups
are fighting than they would otherwise. 
THE CONSUMER AS CITIZEN
Coming back to the issue of consumption and consumer rights, I now wish to draw
attention to the fact that rights, claims, interests, mobilizations, and organizations of
consumers as social groups or as political forces probably represent one of the more
enduring blind spots in the field of political economy, as I already mentioned at the
onset.11 For over two centuries, political economy has dedicated time and energy to
the study of production, circulation, distribution; to capitalists, banks, investors,
workers, and employees; and, comparatively speaking, little time and energy to the
end point –and even less to the ultimate goal– of the production cycle. This situation
is all the more paradoxical, as seen from a sociological and a political perspective at
least, since, with the advent of the so-called “Keynesian revolution,” consumption
was a central measure of economic activity as well as a determinant variable in the
establishment of a national economic cycle. For Keynes, personal expenditures and
household consumption were part of the main determinants of final demand, the other
three being investments, government spending, and net exports.
In this regard, the study made by historian lizabeth Cohen in her Consumer’s
Republic (2003) can fill an important gap. Cohen shows that over the past 80 years or
so, we witnessed the emergence of two ideal types: on the one hand, the emblematic
figure of the so-called “consumer-as-king” who takes it upon himself to protect the
nation’s welfare and, to do so, nudges or pushes government into defending the rights,
the security, and the equal treatment of consumers in the marketplace; and, on the
other, the consumer as buyer, whose sole contribution to society consists of, and is
strictly limited to, the exercise of his or her purchasing power, a gesture far removed
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11 This judgment should be qualified. For instance, in his book American Capitalism. The Concept of Coun -
tervailing Power (1956), John Kenneth Galbraith framed the role played by purchasers as a countervailing
power under monopoly capitalism, but this expression did not include the final consumer or final con-
sumption as such. This being said, Galbraith would tackle the issue in The Affluent Society (1958), a book
dealing with mass affluence and indebtedness as the products and by-products of artificial needs created
by advertizing agencies. however, in Monopoly Capital (1966), Paul a. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy went
even further and showed that the “sales effort” by advertizing agencies, in particular, played a central
role, along with military spending, deficit financing, and tax subsidies, in the absorption of surplus pro-
duction under “monopolistic competition.” But, in both these cases, the consumer is seen more as an extra
—if not a victim— than a social and political actor in his or her own right.
from any political or social commitment. The first scenario emerges in the wake of
“the Keynesian revolution, [when] consumers were becoming responsible for high-
er productivity and full employment, whereas a decade earlier that role had uncon-
testedly belonged to producers” (Cohen, 2003: 55). She adds the following comment:
how the tension between citizen consumer and purchaser consumer was resolved would
have far-reaching consequences for postwar life. It would redefine gender roles, how
women and men exerted influence in their families and communities and how that influ-
ence was recognized by the state. It would reshape class politics, as the labor movement
began to embrace mass consumption as a legitimate terrain for organizing and collective
bargaining….and the nature of reconversion would even determine the physical recon-
struction of metropolitan landscapes, both residential and commercial. at stake was nothing
less than the future contours of american democratic society. (Cohen, 2003: 100)
Consumers’ movements and their mobilization peaked in the early 1960s when,
on March 15, 1962, President Kennedy sent a special message to Congress proposing
the adoption of a Consumer Bill of Rights, incorporating six basic rights: 1) the right
of consumers to be protected against injuries; 2) the right to choose freely; 3) the
right to be heard; 4) the right to be informed; 5) the right to education; and finally,
6) the right to service including warranties, costs of loans, and labelling. 
at the time, writes Cohen,
consumer activists inside and outside of government made three levels of demands, with
the first two achieving more success than the third. The first level sought to pass laws to
protect consumers better [sic!] in the marketplace. The second level aimed to reorient the
government’s regulatory authority toward the public interest….The third level, on which
the least headway was made, aimed to give consumers a permanent voice in government
through a separate department of the consumer or other such agency within the executive
branch. In essence, this third level sought to broaden protection in the economic sphere to
representation in the political sphere, binding consumer and citizen ever closer. (2003: 358)
But in the wake of a series of attacks mounted by manufacturers’ associations
and business organizations dating from the McCarthy years and pursued relent-
lessly up until today, consumer activists and organizations were dealt a series of
political blows and deprived of effective representation in federal agencies.12 never -
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pro-business stance played a crucial role in dismantling consumer protection. See Pertschuk (1982) and
Mayer (1989).
theless, this does not mean or imply that there were no gains in the form of legisla-
tion or even in the form of government regulation in consumers’ interests. lizabeth
Cohen lists 33 measures enacted between 1960 and 1977 alone, starting with the
Federal hazardous Substances act of 1960 and ranging all the way to the Fair Debt
Collection Practices act of 1977. She gives 12 examples of regulations, among which
are the Consumer Product Safety Commission of 1972 and the Freedom of Infor -
mation act of 1974 (2003: 360).13
Consequently, as a net result of these regulatory initiatives, combined with a
flat rebuttal on the political front, “the Consumers’ republic is transmogrified into
the Consumerization of the republic,” an expression whereby Cohen implies that
consumers as political actor –in the singular– have been superseded by the indivi dual
purchaser with his or her “what’s best for me is what’s best for america” attitude
(2003: 397). In other words, the right of consumers to be protected against injuries
and the right to choose freely failed to provide adequate protection against predatory
practices of businesses and government agencies, a situation that will endure as
long as nothing happens in terms of due representation for consumers in the polit-
ical sphere. Such a demand is all the more justified and warranted when one under-
lines the fact that entrepreneurs, producers, investors, financiers, and the like all
occupy central positions through their own representatives both within regulatory
agencies and within governments as well. 
In this regard, in his review of Greenspan’s biography quoted above, Benjamin
Friedman pointed to this lopsided interpretation of regulation when he underlined,
“In addition, poorly disclosed compensation arrangements for brokers, which would
be illegal in the securities market, have persisted in the mortgage market and give
mortgage brokers substantial incentives to steer customers into loans that are exces-
sively expensive or risky or both. But in the build-up to today’s mortgage market
mess, numerous potentially helpful government agencies also either dropped the
ball or looked the other way. as early as 2001, the Treasury Department tried to get
subprime lenders to adopt a code of ‘best practices’ and to submit to monitoring, but
the large lenders objected and the Treasury did not press the matter. The Depart -
ment of housing and Urban Development likewise proposed a set of rules for real
estate transactions but then failed to follow through. as recently as 2006 there was an
interagency initiative to regulate non-traditional mortgage products such as pack-
aged subprime mortgages, but again nothing came of it” (2008: 28). 
169
The eConoMIC CrISIS oF 2008-2009  
eSSaYS
13 In the meantime, business interests reacted against consumer political demands and set up their own
Consumer Federation of america (CFa) in 1967 (Cohen, 2003: 385).
These comments fit all too well with Cohen’s own analysis and show that self-
discipline or self-regulation, or even re-regulation, are clearly insufficient if they are
not tied to some kind of consumer representation and a legitimate political review
process carried on at the instigation of those who are collectively and directly con-
cerned or affected by the rulings in question.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, I want to come back to the terminology I used in the title of this article.
“Consumer democracy” is both a curious and an ambiguous expression. as often
as not, in political science these days, a number of analysts see the political sphere
itself as a market for promises made by power brokers who resort to a currency
called the vote. In turn, and symmetrically, the citizen sees –or should see– him- or
herself as a holder of this currency which he or she must use to his or her exclusive
advantage and sole benefit. This “consumerization of democracy” –to borrow from
Cohen– has little to do with the recognition, the promotion, and the enforcement of
consumers’ collective rights as political rights in a democracy.
In this regard, if there is no theoretical contradiction between electoral democ-
racy and consumer democracy in the sense that the first does not preclude the sec-
ond, in practice, electoral democracy as practised today is in many respects quite
incompatible with democracy in society. This question then brings to the fore the
nature of the consumer democracy that should be implemented. essentially, the closer
its ties to democracy in society, the less consumer democracy would fit and blend
into present-day electoral democracy.
But as we saw when we introduced emmanuel lévy’s argument on individual
and collective rights, there seems to be a misunderstanding at play here. If, within
the liberal mind space and interpretation, electoral democracy rests on the individ-
ual right of each and every voter, according to the alternative interpretation pro-
vided by lévy, the isolated voter is a prey lured into thinking that he/she furthers
his/her own individual interest while contributing to the establishment and conso l -
idation of the collective rights of the holders of power positions, his/her so-called
representatives. To understand this asymmetry and the permutation between col-
lective and individual rights, in line with Pierre Bourdieu, one should establish power
positions in a similar theoretical framework to the one lévy used when he analyzed
capital.14 In essence, if power positions are forms of capital –or better still, forms of
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assets– they carry all the duties, and their holders have all the rights, among which is
the right to use these power positions not for their own personal gain or advantage
–that is called corruption– but surely for that of their principal,15 their constituent,
or more plainly for the advantage of their own in-group, circle, clan, coterie, or
whatever. and if this fact is fully recognised for what it is, an inescapable reality, it
would be better to let others on board who can defend their own collective interests
with the same tools, as it were, instead of carrying on with the worn-out rationale about
the grandeur of the minimalist approach to democracy provided by the ballot, which,
all things considered, gives the advantage to the select few to the detriment of all
others. Furthermore, the opposition between individualistic and collective interpre -
tations of political responsibility and engagement could probably gain a lot if it were
reframed in Guillermo o’Donnell’s terms, when he opposed a low- and a high-
intensity citizenship. In this sense, a citizen committed to an individualistic interpre -
tation of power positions would engage in low-intensity citizenship, whereas one
committed to an openly collective or social or even corporatist interpretation would
exercise high-intensity citizenship (o’Donnell, 2004). and if those in power (bankers,
investors, and shareholders) exercise this kind of high-intensity citizenship when
they defend the interests of their own in-groups, consumers should not let them-
selves be caught up in low-intensity citizenship and consultation practices.
In fine, the collective rights of consumers, on the condition they are given fair
and equitable treatment, applied in adequate and open schemes of governance
within appropriate administrative, corporate, or political ruling bodies, could pro-
vide minimal safeguards to groups of consumers that mere consultation processes
cannot provide. This would spare the individual consumer some of the hardships
that result from the greedy practices expanded with impunity by their leaders and
their lenders.16
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15 “In an agency relationship, the principal is the person who gives authority to another, called an agent, to
act on his or her behalf.” The Free Dictionary (n.d.).
16 how these collective rights should be framed, and what governance scheme should be set up in order to
provide maximum effectiveness, are questions that deserve separate treatment altogether, but one inter-
esting precedent in this regard is the Consumer Bill of rights of 1962. See Cohen (2003: 347).
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